INTRODUCTION

Overview
The aim of this legal opinion is to give a definition of the right to property from a human rights perspective. A survey of the right to property in international law, regional instruments and national constitutions will be followed by an analysis of the scope and content of the right to property and correlative States' obligations. Special attention will be paid to the role of the right to property in the realization of other human rights, in particular the rights to food, adequate housing and social security. Existing jurisprudence at the international, regional and national levels and doctrinal opinion will be used to define the right to property from a human rights perspective.
Genesis of the Right to Property and Certain Recurrent Issues
The right to property can be traced to the early philosophical writings leading to the French Revolution's Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen 2 and the US Bill of Rights
3
. Long after the first 18th century developments, the classification of the right to property as a human right continued to raise controversies.
One of the grounds for debate is the fact that property has been a privilege of the few and served in the past as a means of excluding the large mass of non-possessors from social and political life. 4 The merit of this argument is that it pinpoints an intrinsic tension between the right to property as a civil liberty and its social function. The right to property, understood as a means of survival, is closely related to the realization of the right to life and of other human rights of the individual. At the same time, however, its limitation may be necessary for the realization of other human rights of other individuals. 5 Western liberal tradition places this right among other freedoms, while its characteristics unequivocally would lead to its inclusion among economic, social and cultural rights.
Another line of argumentation suggests that certain characteristics of property, such as the possibility to sell, trade or destroy it, are in conflict with the inalienability principle characteristic of human rights. 6 This kind of interpretation is perhaps tributary to a view of human rights solely through the lenses of civil and political rights. A comparison with economic, social and cultural rights -for example the right to food, where food itself can be sold, traded or destroyed -would make critics feel more at ease with the right to property as a human right, despite the alienable right to property in the Covenants can by no means be equated with the denial of the right.
14 In fact, at its tenth session, the Commission on Human Rights approved the first sentence of the draft article on the right to property as follows: "The States Parties to this Covenant undertake to respect the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others". 15 But objections persisted on the limitations of the right and restrictions of State action, in particular expropriation. The Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights summarize best the mindset of the drafters: "(…) no one questioned the right of the individual to own property (…) it was generally admitted that the right to own property was not absolute" and "there was wide agreement that the right (…) was subject to some degree of control by the State" while "certain safeguards against abuse must be provided."
16 Despite this consensual background, ideological and regional differences could not be bridged on the matter of limitations. The Commission on Human Rights adjourned the consideration of the issue sine die. As a result, property only appears in both Covenants as part of the non-discrimination clause.
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Several other core human rights treaties adopted after 1966 refer to property rights, despite the non-inclusion of the right to property in the two Covenants. Most of these instruments oblige States parties to ensure equality in respect to property ownership. Articles 15(2) and 16(1)(h) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted in 1979, proclaim the equal treatment of women and men in respect to ownership of property. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted in 1990, has the most detailed property clause, including conditions for permissible State interference:
No migrant worker or member of his or her family shall be arbitrarily deprived of property, whether owned individually or in association with others. Where, under the legislation in force in the State of employment, the assets of a migrant worker or a member of his or her family are expropriated in whole or in part, the person concerned shall have the right to fair and adequate compensation. (Art. 15)
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities contains clauses on property rights under Articles 5(3) and 30(3). The latter provision is an acknowledgement of the necessary limitations of intellectual property rights as a means of realizing other human rights of persons with disabilities.
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Finally, the 1989 International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples recognizes the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the land they traditionally occupy, and the States' obligation to identify this land and guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession (Art. 14). Where the relocation of these (1) provides that: "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." According to ICESCR, Art 2(2): "The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." 18 Article 30(3) reads: "States Parties shall take all appropriate steps, in accordance with international law, to ensure that laws protecting intellectual property rights do not constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by persons with disabilities to cultural materials." For intellectual property rights and workers and labour-related property rights, see also Krause, "The Right to Property", at 196.
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peoples is necessary, it shall take place with their free and informed consent, and they shall be provided with lands of equal quality and legal status or be fully compensated (Art. 16).
Soft-law instruments related to the right to property have been developed within the United Nations framework aiming to secure and safeguard property rights and related human rights. Some of these are evidence of the intrinsic link between the right to property, the right to housing and land rights. The United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution, known as the Pinheiro principles, which have been endorsed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 2005, are of particular relevance in the context of displacement. 19 The Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement developed by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the right to housing are also relevant. 20 Although it goes beyond the scope of this study, it should be noted that provisions of international humanitarian law offer protection to property rights in times of armed conflict. 
Regional Human Rights Instruments
In addition to the provisions discussed above concerning property rights at the universal level, the right to property is also recognized in regional human rights instruments. The right to property has not been enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, commonly referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
22
, but the first Article of its first Protocol, adopted in 1952, is entitled the "Protection of Property". It recognizes that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The second paragraph of the same article provides the right of a State party "to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties." The context in which the ECHR and its Protocol No. 1 have been drafted -in the aftermath of authoritarian rule and abuse of power by the State -explains the need for safeguards on State actions. At the same time, States were aware of the social function that the right to property fulfils, and they were reluctant to submit political decisions, on issues such as expropriation or nationalization, to judicial review. 23 However, at the end of the negotiations, it was felt that the balanced outcome, although not totally satisfactory, 19 Housing and property restitution in the context of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons: 
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24 Indeed, as we will see below, the vast jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR) is essential in understanding the content of the right and its relation with other rights. As an example here, we can indicate that the ECrtHR made clear that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, using the term "possessions", "is in substance guaranteeing the right of property."
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The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) upholds the right of everyone to the "use and enjoyment of his property" and lays down the possibility of subordinating this right to the interest of society, while at the same time specifying the restrictions on State actions (Article 21). 26 The term "subordinate" ought to be regarded as linguistic evidence of the view championed by Latin American States regarding the importance of the social function of property.
27 Moreover, the novel third clause of the article, prohibiting "usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man"
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, establishes a clear relationship between individuals in respect to property, limiting everyone's right to property by the rights of others. It also clearly spells the duty of States to protect individuals against the property rights of others.
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The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR) guarantees the right to property and outlines the public need and general interest of the community as legitimate grounds for limiting the right. The encroachment on the right must also be in "accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws".
30 Legal scholars argue that among the many clawback clauses which exist in the AfCHPR, Article 14 contains the most far-reaching one. As such, the safeguards on State action remain very weak.
31 At the same time, it is suggested that the clause is legitimate given the colonial past and the pattern of exploitation to which Africa was subjected.
32 Article 13(3) grants equal access to public property and services to every individual, which is particularly important in the African context.
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Article 21 is also rooted in the colonial history of the continent, recognizing the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. Since its relevance might become increasingly appealing to litigators given, for example, the recent large land appropriations by foreign States or companies, it will be quoted in full:
1 The (Revised) Arab Charter of Human Rights, which recently entered into force, provides that "*e+veryone has a guaranteed right to own private property, and shall not under any circumstances be arbitrarily or unlawfully divested of all or any part of his property."
37 It appears that the "or" between "arbitrary" and "unlawful" suggest a disjunctive reading which could be in this case the equivalent of a clawback clause. The article being so general, it remains to be seen how the terms will be interpreted by the Arab Human Rights Committee and by a future Arab Court of Justice. Lastly, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which became legally binding upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 follows the model of Article 1 of Protocol I to the ECHR in respect to the protection of the right to property. 38 In addition, it expressly stipulates that deprivation is subject to fair compensation "paid in good time". 
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, the realization of other human rights in general, and socio-economic rights in particular. Moreover, some constitutions spell out the obligations of the State to protect and fulfil the right to property.
44
Article 25 of the South African Constitution, adopted in 1996, is an elaborate example of the right to property functioning as a means of realizing other human rights, as well as of the role the State must play in this process. 45 Property is guaranteed by the Constitution and "no law may permit arbitrary deprivation".
46 Expropriation is permitted, if prescribed by law, in the public interest or for a public purpose and it is subject to compensation.
47 Paragraph 4 defines the public interest as including "the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources". Detailed provisions are outlined in respect to compensation so as to reflect "an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected".
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Paragraph 5 spells out the duty of the State to fulfil the right to property in respect to land: "The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis." The person or community whose tenure of land is insecure as a consequence of apartheid is entitled "either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress."
49 Paragraph 8 spells the positive obligation of the State to enact legislation to give effect to the latter provision. Lastly, the Constitution proclaims a right to restitution for those who suffered forced removal during the apartheid regime. (4)), is to be understood in the context of the fall of communism where nationalization of property was based on criteria such as religion or political views. In addition, in the view of the accession to the European Union a clause has been introduced which reverses the previous prohibition of foreigners to own property, conditioning the right to property by the EU Accession Treaty stipulations and reciprocal conditions of other international treaties (Art.44(2)). For another context specific example, see the Constitution of China as amended in 2004, which has clauses on both private property and public property (Art. 12 and 13). For a very detailed article on the right to property, see Article 27 of the Constitution of Mexico, adopted in 1917. 42 The Swiss Constitution adopted in 1999 offers an example of a clause phrased in general terms: "1. La propriété est garantie. 2. Une pleine indemnité est due en cas d'expropriation ou de restriction de la propriété qui équivaut à une expropriation." 43 Van Banning defines the social function as the obligation of the owner to use the property for the satisfaction of his needs but also the collective needs of society; as such, it refers to the rules regulating the relationship between the needs of the individual and the needs of society. The term predates the UDHR and the ICESCR and while related it should not be confused with a social right. T. R. G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property, at 147-148. 44 Ibid, at 147. See for example the Constitution of South Africa, Articles 7 and 25. See also The Human Rights Resource Center, The Circle of Rights, Module 18 -Land rights. 45 The context in which the South African Constitution was adopted is essential. Geoff Budlendert notes that "forced removals were the only form of apartheid injustice which the new government was specifically instructed to redress as a matter of constitutional obligation", arguing that the resolution of land claims are of central importance in the process of national reconciliation. G. Budlender, "Restitution of Housing and Property Rights: Some Lessons from the South-African Experience", 19 Refugee Survey Quarterly 3, 2000, at 224. 46 South African Constitution of 1996, Art. 25 (1). 47 Ibid, Art. 25 (2). 48 Ibid, Art. 25 (3). 49 Ibid, Art. 25 (6). 50 Ibid, Art. 25 (7).
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The Constitution of Brazil represents another clear example where the right to property has been interpreted as a modality of furthering other social and economic rights. The drafters explicitly mention the social function of property among the terms that qualify the inviolability of property 51 and go on to stipulate that:
It There is no doubt that agrarian reform is a necessary step in realizing the right to food and the right to social security of small farmers and landless workers in Brazil 53 and it is with this intention that the drafters of the Constitution put forward this limitation of the right to property. In addition to the articles that stipulate the social function of urban property and allow for expropriation under certain conditions The interplay between the right to housing and the right to property is very important here. While expropriation represents a limitation of the right to property so as to further the right to housing of others, the acquiring of property rights -hence a strengthening of the property regime -when previously no such rights existed, can again lead to the realization of the right to housing.
While the social function of property is said to be a constitutional development in Africa, Asia and Latin America during the last decades 55 , limitations based on social aspects of the right to property can also be found in Western Constitutions. The Constitution of Ireland, for example, after recognizing that the right to property is fundamental, admits that "the exercise of [the right to property] ought, in civil society, to be regulated by the principles of social justice" and that "*t+he State, accordingly, may as occasion requires delimit by law the exercise of the said rights with a view to reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the common good." 56 Germany's Grundgesetz states that: "Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good." 57 Lastly, one should regard the prohibition of monopolies and the correlative duty of the State to protect in the context of the right to property's social function. And indeed, the United States has enacted legislation and continues to allocate considerable resources to prevent, control and dismantle monopolies. 
The Customary Law Character of the Right to Property
The review of provisions of international instruments, regional treaties and national constitutions reveal the universal recognition of the human right to property. It appears that generalized and consistent State practice and opinio juris reflect the customary nature of the first paragraph of Article 17 of the UDHR "*e+veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others". The universal acceptance of general interest as a lawful limitation to the right to property (provided certain other conditions are met, as will be discussed in Part III), as illustrated by the concept of eminent domain itself, places the social function of property -which guarantees the realization of the core content of other economic, social and cultural rights -in the realm of customary norms. 59 While preempting the further analysis, it can be said that stipulations of international and regional instruments, as well as the interpretation attributed to these by the supervisory bodies, in addition to the convergent juridical opinion of scholars and the evidence provided by consensually adopted resolutions of the UN General Assembly suggest that the payment of compensation in cases of unlawful and lawful deprivation of property has become a requirement of customary international law.
The controversial aspect that remains debated to these days refers to the standard of compensation applicable in cases of lawful expropriation. Section 3.4 of this study deals at length with this issue by looking at compensation and the general principles of international law.
THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND CORRELATIVE STATES' OBLIGATIONS
After the description of the provisions on the right to property in universal, regional and national instruments, we can conclude that the general acceptance of the right to property is beyond doubt. But the definition of the right to property varies in the different legal instruments, in particular with regard to its limitations, the allowed balancing of interests and the clauses on social aspects. We must therefore conclude that "the content of the right to property ultimately remains a question of interpretation by the supervisory organs". 60 In this third part, the object, scope and content of this right, as well as the right holders, the standard of compensation and the correlative States' obligations, will be defined with the help of a jurisprudential analysis.
The Object of the Right
None of the universal and regional instruments discussed offers a clear-cut definition of the object of the right, i.e. property or, in the language of the ECHR, "possessions".
In the absence of the right to property being stipulated by the ICCPR, its supervisory organ -the Human Rights Committee (HRC) -has not dealt with the right directly. 61 The extent to which the jurisprudence of the HRC is informative in relation to the content of the right is therefore minimal. Regional supervisory bodies, in contrast to international bodies, have been more prolific in this area.
The ECrtHR has given the term "possessions" a wide interpretation. Two important aspects ought to be mentioned here. First, the term may refer to "existing possessions" or assets, including claims in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a "legitimate expectation" of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right."
62 It is clear however that the Court does not see any right to acquire property, as arising under the Protocol or the Convention. 63 The Court takes the view that "the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively" and "conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition" lie outside the meaning of possessions of Article 1 of Protocol No.1. 64 In Malhous vs. the Czech Republic, the Court concluded that Mr. Malhous could not have had any "legitimate expectation" of realizing his claim to restitution of his father's property, given that under the Land Ownership Act only those plots which were in the possession of the State or of a legal person could be returned, as opposed to those which had in the meantime been assigned to natural persons.
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Legal Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights Perspective Looking at the object of the right to property, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR) took a similar approach in the Five Pensioners case, in so far as it established the need for an "acquired" right in accordance with enacted legislation to exist 66 , or in the words of the InterAmerican Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, "an asset that formed part of the patrimony of the alleged victims". 67 According to the IACrtHR, the "possession" of indigenous people is of a special character, since the "acquired by law" character is more lax:
1. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights gave an almost identical interpretation to the property rights of indigenous people, when it concluded in its recent Endorois case that "possession is not a requisite condition for the existence of indigenous land restitution rights."
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The second aspect in respect to the object of property refers to its "autonomous meaning". 70 The ECrtHR held that property covers both movable and immovable property, and is not limited to physical goods, nor is it dependent on formal classification in domestic law. 71 69 The relevant paragraph from the Commission's decision reads as follows: "(1) traditional possession of land by indigenous people has the equivalent effect as that of a state-granted full property title; (2) traditional possession entitles indigenous people to demand official recognition and registration of property title; (3) the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith; and (4) the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, when those lands have been lawfully transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality. In its recent decision in the Endorois case, the African Commission, while considering the autonomous meaning of property rights, recalled its views in the Ogoni case, where it found that the right to property "includes not only the right to have access to one's property and not to have one's property invaded or encroached upon, but also the right to undisturbed possession, use and control of such property however the owner(s) deem fit." 78 It then goes on to take note of the ECrtHR practice according to which "property rights could also include the economic resources and rights over the common land of the applicants."
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As evidenced by the jurisprudence of the regional supervisory bodies, it appears straightforward and unquestionable that one of the key objects of property is land.
The Right Holders
The holders of the right to property under the ECHR are natural and legal persons. In Article 21, the ACHR recognizes the right of everyone to property. Following the precedent set by the InterAmerican Commission
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, the IACrtHR has interpreted the provisions of this article as allowing for a communal or collective right of indigenous people, basing itself on the special spiritual link between indigenous people and their lands and their system of land ownership, which is not centered on an individual but on the group and its community. 81 In its decision in the Moiwana case, in 2005, the Court extended the notion of collective property rights beyond indigenous people, hence recognizing other groups of individuals as right holders. 82 The Court has upheld this position in a more recent case. , clarifies beyond question that every individual has the right to property under the Charter. In its recent case, after having established that the Endorois "are 'a people', a status that entitles them to benefit from provisions of the African Charter that protect collective rights" 87 , the Commission recognizes "the right to property with regard to its ancestral land, the possessions attached to it, and their animals" of the Endorois community. 88 The African Commission thus explicitly acknowledges a right to communal property in the case of indigenous people.
In light of historic discriminatory practices, women as property rights holders deserve special attention. In Marckx v. Belgium, a case concerning discriminatory inheritance practices, the ECrtHR found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 "by reason of the fact that an unmarried mother is not free to dispose of her property in favour of her child." The Court's comment is paradigmatic:
In 
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A number of relevant cases at national, regional and international levels deal, inter alia, with inheritance customary rights that discriminate between men and women, and with discriminatory provisions related to the administration of the communal property within marriage. 
The Content of the Right to Property
To define the right to property, the ECrtHR enunciated three rules in Interference of property, while allowed, must satisfy certain conditions cumulatively: the principle of legality, a general or public interest character and a proportionality test. The principle of legality includes that interference must be prescribed by law, but the law must also be published and accessible and gather certain qualitative characteristics to be "compatible with the rule of law".
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The lawful interference of the individual's property rights must also pass the test of legitimacy, in other words it needs to be pursued in the general or public interest. Under the margin of appreciation doctrine, the Court has in the past often deferred to the interpretation of general interest given by States in the context of property rights. 93 In James v. the United Kingdom, the ECrtHR made a seminal assessment:
Because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is "in the public interest". (…) Furthermore, the notion of "public interest" is necessarily extensive. (…) *T+he decision to enact laws expropriating property will commonly involve consideration of political, economic and social issues on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court, finding it natural that the margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one, will respect the legislature's judgment as to what is "in the public interest" unless that judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation. 94
As we will see below, the notion of public or general interest, which allows a balance of interest to fulfill the social function of property, is therefore particularly significant in the context of the realization of economic and social rights (see Part IV).
The condition of proportionality is also related to the general interest character of the interference. This refers to the reasonable relationship of proportionality which must exist between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. The ECrtHR takes the view that an instance of interference should strike "a 'fair balance' between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights". 95 In practice, although the ECrtHR is said to have employed a lax standard of proportionality, variations are observable. In respect to the control of property (third rule) the Court sets the standard of proportionality at a lower level -consequently allowing for a wider margin of appreciation to States -than in cases related to deprivation or expropriation (second rule). , recent jurisprudential developments are revealing in terms of the Commission's interpretation of the content of this right stipulated by the African Charter. In the 2009 Endorois case, the Commission dealt extensively with the right to property and set out a "twopronged test" entailing that an encroachment must be "in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community" and "in accordance with appropriate laws" 98 , the latter referring to both domestic and international law. 99 At the same time, it set out that the limitations on property rights must be reviewed under the principle of proportionality, i.e. the interference with property rights must be "proportionate to a legitimate need, and should be the least restrictive measure possible." 100 Also, it would appear that the ancestral land of indigenous people belongs to a special category of property, and as the African judicial body puts it "*t+he 'public interest' test is met with a much higher threshold in the case of encroachment of indigenous land rather than individual private property. In this sense, the test is much more stringent when applied to ancestral land rights of indigenous people." 
Compensation and the General Principles of International Law
As has been underlined, the issue of compensation in connection to the right to property has been a thorny one during the drafting process of several human rights instruments. Whereas the ACHR and the AfCHPR (albeit only in Article 21) have certain provisions on compensation, the European Convention and its First Protocol lack such provisions. For example, the IACrtHR based itself on the ACHR and on the "principle of international law that any violation of an international obligation which has caused damage carries with it the obligation to provide adequate reparation for it" in issuing decisions regarding compensation.
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In the ECHR-context, given the silence of the Convention, there was stringent need for clarification through the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR. Thus, the Court noted that protection offered by property rights would be "largely illusory and ineffective" in the absence of compensation.
. 103 In the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR since the 1980s, it has therefore become generally accepted that in cases of deprivation, compensation is implicitly required. As Theo van Banning observes, since both deprivation and control are forms of limiting the right to property, "ideally there should not be a substantial difference" between the two, nonetheless in "actual practice there is a strong tradition whereby deprivation normally leads to compensation and control does not lead to compensation." 104 proportionality the Court noted the lack of adequate compensation and went on to find a violation of the right to property.
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Having seen that compensation has become an integral part of the proportionality test in respect to property rights 106 , even in the absence of an express mentioning in the ECHR, the standards according to which the level of compensation is established must be addressed. In this context, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom is a relevant case, which helps frame the discussion. The case concerns the nationalization of certain interests of several ship and aircraft building companies by the UK government. The applicant companies did not contest the legitimate aim of the nationalization, however they claimed that the received compensation was "grossly inadequate" and that they had been victims of breaches of [inter alia] Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 107 The British Government had decided upon a compensation system that valued the applicants' shares by reference to their value three years prior to the date of the actual transfer of shares; it was reckoned that such a system of compensation would avoid a value that could be artificially affected by the knowledge of the nationalization. 108 In respect to this reasoning the Court made some important findings:
The It follows thus, that the market value, or to be precise, "an amount reasonably related" to this value, is the general standard according to which compensation in cases involving taking of property ought to be paid. Nonetheless, as the Court clearly specified, full compensation is not a guaranteed right. 110 Pursuing economic reform or greater social justice may qualify as legitimate measures of general interest which may require less than the reimbursement of the full market price of the property at stake. This interpretation, which acknowledges the important social function property plays within societies, is coherent with earlier and later judgments of the European Court. 111 105 The case was brought by ten landowners who had the exclusive hunting rights on their land. The French legislature considered that it would be in the general interest to make smaller landowners form an association granting hunting rights to all concerned over their land put together. However, the applicants, who were animal-welfare activists opposed to hunting, claimed that the compulsory transfer of hunting rights infringed their right to property as protected by Article 1 of Protocol I of the ECHR. As the Court observed, compensating landowners with the ability to hunt on the land of others "is valuable only in so far as all the landowners concerned are hunters or accept hunting. Moreover, the Court asserts that the standard of compensation may vary depending on the nature of the property and the circumstances of the taking and that the wide margin of appreciation which the State enjoys applies to the assessment weather the deprivation of property is in the public interest as well as to the terms of compensation.
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Another important aspect relevant to the level of compensation debate, which received attention in Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, refers to the "general principles of international law". The applicants claimed that the express mention in the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the general principles of international law meant that the international law requirement of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation for the deprivation of property of foreigners also applied to nationals." 113 The European judges, building on previous case law and the travaux préparatoires, firmly asserted their view that "the principles in question are not applicable to a taking by a State of the property of its own nationals", but "solely to non-nationals".
114 According to the official record then "the general principles of international law, in their present connotation, entailed the obligation to pay compensation to non-nationals in cases of expropriation".
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A manual on compensation in international investment law observes that the compatibility of the European Court's jurisprudence with the disputes heard by investment tribunals is "somehow limited" by the preponderance in the ECrtHR of cases brought by nationals against their own States.
116 However, the authors -in a statement echoing the need to stop or rather limit the fragmentation of the international legal system -acknowledge the potential of the ECHR as an international legal instrument and of the interpretation given to it by the European Court "to inform international dispute settlement generally".
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The attempt to disclose the general principles of international law in relation to the standards of compensation 118 should begin by recalling the 1928 Chorzów Factory Case, so often cited by tribunals in cases of deprivation of property of foreign nationals and companies. The case decided upon by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) concerned the Polish unlawful expropriation of German-owned industrial property within Poland. According to the Court, the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law are the following:
[ 113 Ibid, para 111. Hence, their assertion was that in similar cases in general international law it is the date of taking which is considered as the date of assessment. Therefore, they claimed that the relevant date for assessing the value of the shares -which had actually increased in the period leading to the actual transfer -should be closer to the date of taking. The PCIJ distinguishes between lawful and unlawful expropriation, while outlining the requirement of full compensation in the context of an illegal taking of property. This historic distinction has been taken over by the International Law Commission in its work in codifying international law in respect to compensation required as a consequence of expropriation. In this sense, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility deal with takings amounting to wrongful acts of states and explicitly exclude lawful expropriations. 120 The remaining debate then refers to the standard of compensation, or in other words how much compensation should be awarded, in cases of lawful deprivation of property. In the 1930s already, the PCIJ standard has been extrapolated to cases of legal takings, termed as the "Hull formula" and seen as equivalent 121 to the "prompt, adequate and effective" requirement. 122 The strongest contestation of the Hull formula came during the 1960s and 1970s. Most States that emerged from the process of decolonization expressed their "permanent sovereignty over natural resources *…+ primarily through large-scale nationalization of mineral extraction facilities, the renegotiation of existing arrangements and the creation of state enterprises and numerous commodity producer associations." 123 A series of UN General Assembly resolutions which were promoted and strongly supported by developing and socialist States are evidence of the conceptual rift that emerged in relation to the applicable standard of compensation. In 1962, resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources affirmed the right to nationalize foreign owned property and required the nationalizing State to pay "appropriate compensation": 124 
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.
125
The vagueness of the term "appropriate" and the requirement that compensation be attributed in accordance with international law are said to have made consensus in the General Assembly possible at that time. 126 However, already then two divergent positions had become evident. Developed countries maintained that "appropriate" was to be interpreted according to traditional principles of international law and hence the Hull formula. Developing States insisted that it ought to be read in the light of relevant circumstances and compensation should be awarded in accordance to the national law of the expropriating State (the Calvo doctrine). 127 The 1974 Rights and Duties of States while employing the term "appropriate" left out any reference to the need for compensation to be paid in accordance with international law. 128 The resolution aiming to establish a New International Economic Order represented in fact the peak of the disagreement between the North and the South on the issue of the standard of compensation. While it had been portrayed as a rejection of international law by some authors 129 , de Arechaga notes that this description of the General Assembly resolution 3281 is "not entirely accurate":
Though expelled through the door because of its alleged identification with the doctrine of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation", *international law+ has come back through the window in the garb of an equitable principle which takes into account the specific circumstances of each case and is more likely to be of assistance in the settlement of investment disputes through negotiation or, if the parties so agree, through adjudication.
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In Texaco v. Libya, the arbitrator, while asserting that by virtue of the consensual nature of resolution 1803 "appropriate compensation" had become the new customary standard, dismissed the resolution 3281 as de lege feranda. 131 Given the lack of a general and consistent State practice and the divergence within doctrine, it is rather difficult to hold the "appropriate compensation" requirement as it has been interpreted by developing countries as the customary principle in relation to compensation. Nonetheless, it would be equally difficult -in the presence of strong opposition from developing States -to hold the traditional requirement of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" as a continued expression of customs. What can be noted however is the "large degree of flexibility and discretion" which the "appropriate compensation" formula grants to arbitrators "allowing them to rely on various considerations including equity, balanced outcome, capacity of a State to pay".
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The post-Cold War period has seen a tremendous increase in bilateral investment treaties, the majority of which are said to contain reference to the "adequate" standard as part of the Hull formula, which thus call for compensation equivalent to the market value. 133 However, it is also noted that some treaties include specific mention of "just" and/or "equitable" compensation, which hence suggest the possibility of tribunals to take other circumstance into account during arbitration.
134 Sergey Ripinsky and Kevin Williams recommend caution while inferring from the current proliferation of bilateral investment treaties and their preference for the Hull formula the clear return to the traditional general principle of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" assessed on the basis of market value of the expropriated investment. They conclude that "customary international law is not fully settled on the issue of compensation for lawful expropriation".
Correlative States' Obligations
The jurisprudence of the main three regional judicial bodies is consistent with the fact that both "negative and positive" obligations of States arise under the respective Conventions in respect to property rights.
The "negative" duty of the State to respect the right to property amounts to an abstention of interference with the right. In the European system, State actions such as expropriation, de jure or de facto, temporary seizure of property, destruction of property, rent controls, and planning restrictions have been held, under certain circumstances, to represent a breach of the obligation to respect the right to property. 136 In recent years, the ECrtHR has also dealt with several cases where it found that "the genuine, effective exercise of the right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may give rise to positive obligations". 137 Öneryildiz v. Turkey is an illustrative example. The applicants lived in a slum quarter in Istanbul built without authorization next to a rubbish tip. An expert report pointed to the fact that the tip represented a danger for the slum inhabitants in the absence of measures preventing a methane explosion. In 1993, a methane explosion occurred, which killed nine close relatives and destroyed the house of the applicants. In respect to the right to property, the ECrtHR stated:
In the Court's view, the resulting infringement amounts not to "interference" but to the breach of a positive obligation, since the State officials and authorities did not do everything within their power to protect the applicant's proprietary interests. 138 In its jurisprudence, the Court has also held that the positive obligation of States to protect property rights continues to exist in cases involving litigation between private entities. For example, States are required to take concrete measures to put in place a judicial mechanism for settling effectively property disputes and to ensure that such a mechanism complies with the material and procedural safeguards enshrined in the Convention. 139 Although the ECrtHR does not acknowledge a right to acquire property
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, in James and Others v. the United Kingdom the Court employs language that resonates with the States' obligation to fulfill. The applicants in this case were trustees of the estate of the Duke of Westminster who owned a large number of houses in London. They complained that they lost a considerable amount of money as a result of the implementation of the Leasehold Reform Act, which gave tenants with lease of 21 years the possibility to buy the houses under the market price. In short, the ECrtHR granted a wide margin of appreciation to the Government both in respect to the aim and to the measures undertaken to secure the aim, based on the following reasoning:
Eliminating In its important decision in the Awas Tingni case, the IACrtHR clearly took the position that a State has both negative and positive obligations under the relevant provisions of the ACHR. The Court found that the Awas Tingni indigenous community "has the right that the Nicaraguan State carry out the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the territory"
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, which indeed amounts to a positive State obligation.
In the African continent, the Ogoni case deserves particular attention for the integrated approach that the African Commission took, also in respect of the correlative State's obligations. The complaint alleged that the military Government of Nigeria has been directly involved in oil production through the State oil company in a consortium with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC), whose activities in the Ogoni region caused environmental contamination, health problems and a climate of terror. The communication lodged by two non-governmental organizations on behalf of the Ogoni people alleged violations of many articles of the AfCHPR, including Article 14 (right to property) and Article 21 (right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources). It was further alleged that the Government condoned and facilitated the violations by placing the legal and military authorities at the disposal of the company. Moreover, the Nigerian security forces allegedly contributed to the violations by attacking and burning villages and homes. It was alleged that the State failed to investigate and punish the perpetrators. After making appeal to foreign case-law, the African Commission emphasized the duty of States to protect their citizens "not only through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by protecting them from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties". 143 It then continued, stating the following:
The In its most recent decision involving the property rights of the Endorois indigenous community, the African Commission analyzed the usual framework of States obligations -respect, protect, fulfilland made a case for the legality and indeed the requirement to, in certain circumstance, redress imbalances through positive discrimination or affirmative action.
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To sum up this section on the correlative States' obligations in respect to the right to property, appeal will be made to another emblematic statement of the African Commission: 
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
As the 1993 report of the Independent Expert "on the right of everyone to own property alone as well as in association with others" points out, the right to property is not an isolated right, but one which is instrumental in "enhancing both personal dignity and fostering socio-economic wellbeing." 147 Jurisprudence of regional bodies appears to support this claim. Three economic, social and cultural rights will be addressed in the remainder of this paper in connection to the right to property: the right to housing, the right to food and the right to social security.
The Right to Property and the Right to Housing
The link between property and housing is indeed so obvious that it requires little explanation. The ECrtHR has produced abundant case-law on the right to property as a means of protecting one's house. 148 Similarly, the Inter-American Commission and the Court dealt with confiscation of houses under Article 21. 149 The African Commission too has addressed the protection of one's house as part of the right to property.
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The use of property rights as a means to further the right to housing, or indeed to obtain redress for violations of housing rights, is perhaps best illustrated by cases related to forced evictions. In Doǧan and Others v. Turkey, the applicants complained that their forced eviction from their village in SouthEastern Turkey by security forces and the refusal of the authorities to allow them to return to their homes and land represents a violation of their property rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol 1. 
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Legal Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights Perspective question regarding the lawfulness of the interference. 152 The ECrtHR concluded that the applicants had to bear an "excessive burden which has upset the fair balance which should be struck between the requirements of the general interest and the protection of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions." 153 In reaching its conclusion, the Court highlighted in particular the Principles 18 and 28 of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 154 The former principle requires the authorities to provide internally displaced persons with, and ensure access to, inter alia, basic shelter and housing, as a component of an adequate standard of living. Principle 28 refers to procedural requirements, such as the consultation with and the full participation of displaced persons in the authorities' attempt to resettle and reintegrate them.
Similarly, the African Commission takes a strict stance while asserting that forced evictions "cannot be deemed to satisfy Article 14 of the Charter's test of being done 'in accordance with the law' *…+ [w]here such removal was forced, this would in itself suggest that the 'proportionality' test has not been satisfied." 155 In the recent Endorois case, it reached this conclusion while making reference to standards outlined by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in its General Comment 4 on the right to housing and General Comment 7 on evictions and the right to housing.
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In the jurisprudence of the African system, the Ogoni case presents particular interest for the current opinion, given the integrated approach embraced by the Commission to allow for a greater protection of economic and social rights. The African Commission expressly asserted that the right to shelter or housing -not mentioned by the Charter -can be distinguished from the "combined effects" of Article 14, 16 and 18. In the words of the Commission:
* The African Commission went on to assert massive violations of the right to shelter "under Article 14 and implicitly recognized by Article 16 and 18(1)".
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Adding another dimension to the link between property and housing, Krause suggests that positive measures, which are related to the duty to fulfill the right to housing, might be in conflict with a strong protection of the right to property. 159 According to the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR, measures related to rent legislation or the possibility of acquiring a previously leased house at advantageous prices, promoted by the State in order to achieve greater social justice and fulfill the right to housing, have been accepted by the Court as having legitimate aims. In Mellacher and others v. Austria, the applicants who owned several flats rented to tenants complained that the implementation of legislation that resulted in a reduction of the rent infringed their right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No.1. The ECrtHR found that the aim of the interference was legitimate and the measure proportionate: 152 Ibid, para 149. 153 Ibid, para 154 -155. 154 160 It thus appears that the Court is prepared to grant large discretion to States when they exercise their obligation to limit the right to property to fulfill the right to housing.
The Right to Property and the Right to Food
Unquestionably, there is an intrinsic link between property, land and food. It is this link, which the African Commission emphasized in the Ogoni case, which makes the right to property and the right to food intimately interdependent.
On the issue of land property rights functioning as a means to realize the right to food, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission and the Court is particularly relevant. In 1996, after having been unsuccessful in their attempt to regain their ancestral land, which was also an important source for their food, the Enxet-Lamenxay and Kayleyphapopyet (Riachito) communities filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission alleging violations of the rights to judicial protection, fair trial, property, residence and the benefits of culture under the ACHR. 161 In 1998, a friendly settlement agreement was signed, under which the State committed itself to purchasing approximately 22,000 hectares in the Paraguayan Chaco region, returning them to the communities and providing the deeds of ownership. The State also guaranteed to provide food, sanitary and educational assistance. 162 In other cases, the IACrtHR interpreted Article 21 of the Convention in light of the economic, social, and cultural rights of indigenous communities. 163 On numerous occasions, it interpreted the right to property of indigenous peoples as requiring a positive obligation of the State to delimitate and demarcate the land, and protect the communal rights to property, to allow them to provide for their own means of subsistence. 164 The Yakye Axa 165 and the Sawhoyamaxa 166 cases are emblematic to present the evolutionary approach of the Court. In the latter case, the Sawhoyamaxa indigenous community, being denied its right to its ancestral lands, was forced to live in appalling conditions with limited access to food. As a consequence of these conditions, 31 members of the community, among them many children, died. 167 As a general principle, the Court asserted that "*t]he right to life is a fundamental human right, which full enjoyment is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of the other human rights. If this right is not respected, all other rights do not have sense." 168 After looking into
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Legal Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights Perspective whether Paraguay has adopted "the necessary measures within the scope of its authority which could be reasonably expected to prevent or avoid the risk to the right to life of the alleged victims" 169 At the end of its reasoning, the Court concluded that Paraguay violated several articles of the ACHR, including Article 4(1) on the right to life and Article 21 on the right to property.
The aim of this section was to analyze cases of property rights that have served to further the right to food. In this context, it is appropriate to recall the recent attempt made by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food at guiding large-scale land acquisition and leases by proposing a set of principles that would bring land property purchases in accordance with the right to food and other human rights. 
The Right to Property and the Right to Social Security
Litigation in respect to the right to property has also been started as a route to enforce different dimensions of the right to social security, with a particular emphasis on pensions. In the past, the European Commission had held that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee a right to pension, but went on to assert that the compulsory contribution to a pension fund may in certain circumstances create a property right in a portion of the fund. 172 This condition had given rise to serious complexities. 173 More recently, in a crucial decision, the ECrtHR refuted this approach and stated that there are no grounds upon which to draw a distinction between contributory and noncontributory benefits for the purposes of the applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 174 In the case at hand, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom, a complaint had been brought under the right to property provision of the First Protocol in conjunction with Article 14 of the ECHR, prohibiting inter alia sex-discrimination. In addition to renouncing to the differentiation doctrine between contributory and non-contributory schemes, the Court made another major assertion. Whereas pension or other social benefits cannot be implied, as such, under the right to property in the European system, the ECrtHR held that if a State has a legislation in force providing for the payment of a welfare benefit as a right, "that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements." 175 In Moskal v. Poland, in 2009, the Court upheld its reasoning and clarified that a pension right claim which is not brought in connection with Article 14, but only as an alleged interference of the property rights alone, is admissible. And it concluded that Article 1 was violated.
